Givenness of Things (Book Review) by Cosgrove, Walker
Volume 44 Number 4 Article 6 
June 2016 
Givenness of Things (Book Review) 
Walker Cosgrove 
Dordt College, walker.cosgrove@dordt.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege 
Recommended Citation 
Cosgrove, Walker (2016) "Givenness of Things (Book Review)," Pro Rege: 
Vol. 44: No. 4, 41 - 44. 
Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol44/iss4/6 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Digital Collections @ 
Dordt. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @ Dordt. 
For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu. 
Pro Rege—June 2016     41 
BOOK REVIEWS
The Givenness of Things. Robinson, Marilynne. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015. 304pp. 
ISBN: 978-0374298470. Reviewed by Walker Cosgrove, Associate Professor of History, Dordt College.
Toward the end of October a good friend of 
mine emailed me a link to an article regarding 
a conversation between President Obama and 
professor and writer Marilynne Robinson, in 
which President Obama interviewed Robinson.1 
The text of his email said jokingly that this 
article revealed that she had become “the high 
priestess of America.”  My response was that we 
could do a whole lot worse than her, since she is 
thoughtful, articulate, learned, and supportive 
of the traditional arts and sciences in higher 
education. After reading her new book of essays, 
The Givenness of Things, I am further convinced 
that Robinson is quite sympathetic to intellectuals 
and writers, particularly those of a religious bent, 
who remain rooted in knowledge and education 
as historically conceived and have not embraced 
every educational fad of the past twenty years. She 
has little time for much of the nonsense that occurs 
in public, civic, and educational spheres. Her 
nonfiction has done much to shape my thinking 
in many areas, and this new volume furthers that 
influence.
Her magisterial fiction aside (her novels have 
won numerous awards, including the Pulitzer for 
Gilead), Robinson is a rare writer and intellectual 
today. To say she is learned and erudite would 
be obvious, but she wears this learnedness 
comfortably. Furthermore, she is a renaissance 
woman of sorts, dabbling not just in the world of 
her doctoral scholarship (Shakespeare) or teaching 
(creative writing), but easily conversant in theology, 
history, philosophy, political science, and the hard 
sciences, particularly physics. Moreover, she is a 
woman of faith, a subject she does not shy from 
at all. Unlike many celebrated writers and artists 
of faith, Robinson is an unabashed Calvinist, not 
the theological camp one joins to win friends and 
influence people. 
Robinson’s nonfiction is best categorized as two 
different types. The first type, books that meditate 
on a universal whole, includes Mother Country and 
Absence of Mind. What I mean by universal whole 
is that each volume takes up a common, dominant 
theme. Mother Country is an extended essay over 
250 pages regarding the British welfare state and 
nuclear waste, and Absence of Mind is a series of 
lectures on religion and science, her attempt to 
restore the primacy of human consciousness into 
conversations between the two. The second type 
of nonfiction she writes is looser and more free-
wheeling, including collections of occasional 
pieces such as The Death of Adam and When I Was 
a Child. The Givenness of Things fits into this latter 
type, a characteristic that makes doing it justice 
in a review more difficult. Because I cannot touch 
upon every essay in a brief review, I will highlight a 
couple of persistent themes in this new book.
Something I most appreciate about Robinson’s 
nonfiction is her persistent critique of what 
she elsewhere (in The Absence of Mind) calls 
“parascience.”  She defines this term as a theory 
which bases its claims about the world, humanity, 
and ultimate reality upon nineteenth-century 
positivistic notions of science as extolled by 
Auguste Comte, though she clearly demonstrates 
that these claims are not scientific in the least, but 
instead metaphysical.2 Her criticism of parascience 
is stronger for her profound respect of true science 
displayed across her nonfiction, including this 
newest volume.3 And while she is justly critical 
of this theory masquerading as science, she 
frequently extols the “achievements and insights” 
that science has brought over the past hundred 
or so years (4-5). The main focus of her criticism 
of parascience, especially in this volume on 
neuroscience, is that it operates with a model of 
reality that is reductionistic, based ultimately in 
positivism ([73ff]; she even compares parascience 
with religious literalism and religious liberalism 
[see 167, 211]). To Robinson, this reductionism 
leads to an unwillingness to consider the depth of 
mystery that surrounds the mind and personhood; 
as she writes, “Neuroscientists seem predisposed to 
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the conclusion that there is no ‘self ’…. The real 
assertion being made in all this (neuroscience is 
remarkable among the sciences for its tendency 
to bypass hypothesis and even theory and to go 
directly to assertion) is that there is no soul” (8). 
She points to Alexis de Tocqueville as a prophetic 
voice, who connected the view of “progress” in 
his own day and the eventual reduction of the 
human to mere material (75). Let me be clear, 
however. This is not a criticism of true science and 
its search for knowledge and truth: “If there is a 
scientific mode of thought that is crowding out 
and demoralizing the humanities, it is not research 
in the biology of the cell or the quest for life on 
other planets” (12).
The antidote to this materialist reductionism, 
for Robinson, is found in the arts and humanities, 
which help us better explore, process, and 
understand the human experience in all of its 
complexity, diversity, and uniqueness (10-11, 118-
119). Regarding the mysteriousness of the human 
mind, she writes, “If Shakespeare had undergone 
an MRI there is no reason to believe there would 
be any more evidence of extraordinary brilliance in 
him than there would be of a self or a soul. He left 
a formidable body of evidence that he was both 
brilliant and singular, but it has fallen under the 
rubric of Renaissance drama and is somehow not 
germane, perhaps because this places the mind 
so squarely at the center of the humanities” (11). 
True science, she is right to emphasize, welcomes 
and embraces mystery, as can be seen in the recent 
developments in a variety of fields in which what 
we know continues to grow, but  these fields 
humbly acknowledge what we do not know as well. 
Not so for parascience, which assumes that we can 
know all that is knowable and that mystery will be 
dispelled; both assumptions are limited ideas that 
are dangerously reductionistic in defining what 
“human” is (14, 230).
In light of this emphasis on the arts and 
humanities, I find curious Robinson’s praises of the 
philosophy of pragmatism in general and William 
James in particular (73ff). I am well aware of my 
own lack of knowledge regarding pragmatism as 
a philosophy and James as one of its principle 
practitioners, so I tread lightly in my criticism 
here. Part of the problem may be that I am 
unfamiliar with ideas within pragmatism to which 
she is drawn, and I am especially thrown off when 
she suggests that Jonathan Edwards is a pragmatist 
of a kind (77). I’ve read a lot of Edwards and know 
him to be many things, but I’ve never considered 
him a pragmatist.
The reason I find Robinson’s support of 
pragmatism so curious is because of what I 
mentioned above about her encouragement of 
the traditional arts and sciences generally, and 
the humanities specifically.4 Robinson argues that 
in order to understand the deepest part of being 
human, if that is even possible, “we must encourage 
the study of the aptly named humanities” (119). 
Likewise, she is critical of colleges and universities 
because they “now seem obsessed with marketing 
themselves and ensuring the marketability of their 
product, which will make the institution itself 
more marketable—a loop of mutual reinforcement 
of the kind that sets in when thinking becomes 
pathologically narrow” (123). It is pragmatism, 
at least as I think of the philosophy, that causes 
us to focus mainly on economic aspect—James’ 
own metaphor is the “cash value” of an idea—thus 
“ransacking our public school system, [while] we 
have been turning a coldly utilitarian eye on our 
great universities” (114). I agree wholeheartedly 
with Robinson that the way forward is to encourage 
the humanities in academic institutions, because 
they “teach us respect for what we are—we, in 
the largest sense. Or they should, because there 
is another reality, greater than the markets, and 
that is the reality in which the planet is fragile, 
and peace among nations, where it exists, is also 
fragile” (123). Amen.
A second important theme in these essays is the 
cultural importance and influence of Calvinism, 
which helps shape her thought and writing, giving 
much of it a theological tenor. Calvinism, for 
Robinson, is important as a metaphysics because it 
allows one to weather various scientific discoveries, 
particularly in physics, that force us to rethink 
reality as we know it (87-88, 145, 171). According 
to her, much religious thought (literalism and 
liberalism) and parascience is rooted in outdated 
modes of knowing, particularly positivism, and 
thus they lack the framework to wrestle with these 
discoveries in helpful ways.
Robinson’s Calvinism is unconventional, even 
if theologically conservative (for examples, see 73, 
89, 142, 170, 188, 209, 212, 243). It transcends 
typical Calvinist categories, whether doctrinalism, 
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pietism, transformationalism, or any mix of the 
three. What I find interesting is her ability to see 
Calvinism’s pervasive influence in various historical 
eras, even among those that do not seem to 
evidence that influence (61). For example, she finds 
Calvinist influence in Shakespeare and Elizabethan 
England as a whole (50, 62-63, 65-66), as well as 
in nineteenth-century American thought, such as 
Lincoln’s use of Calvinist categories regarding the 
acceptance of suffering with humility (100-101) 
and in Emily Dickinson’s poetry (145). Robinson 
finds Calvinist influence in more traditional places, 
like Jonathan Edwards (87-88) and the Puritans 
(60). She also considers Calvinism’s influence in 
Reformation Era England, particularly in terms 
of the dignity of the working class it encouraged, 
in the move from Latin to vernacular connected 
with the beauty and poetics of English as a written 
language, and in the English Renaissance (19-27, 
53-55, 60-61). 
Perhaps my favorite item in The Givenness 
of Things is a new, or renewed, strain of her 
thought in the return to Shakespeare, the subject 
of her doctoral research. I particularly enjoy her 
theological reading of Shakespeare, and not 
simply because her readings transcend the endless 
debate as to whether Shakespeare was a Protestant 
or a Catholic. Perhaps because I read and enjoy 
Shakespeare for pleasure only and because he is 
not a subject of scholarly study for me, I find her 
theological readings so compelling. She argues that 
in some sense Shakespeare transcends categories 
of orthodoxy and heresy (or of Protestant and 
Catholic) and instead wrestles with much deeper 
and grander human questions (35, 65), such as The 
Tempest, which “takes us as far into the thinnest 
upper atmosphere as anything I know, whether 
art, metaphysics, or theology” (222).
She considers Shakespeare’s wrestling with evil, 
forgiveness, and grace in various plays, asking, 
“How is life to be lived in this fallen world, with 
all its dangers and temptations, if grace is taken to 
be the standard of a virtuous life?” (33)  Robinson 
goes on to write, “I propose that, in his later 
plays, Shakespeare gives grace a scale and aesthetic 
power, and a structural importance, that reach 
toward a greater sufficiency of expression—not 
a definition or a demonstration of grace or even 
an objective correlative for it, but the intimation 
of a great reality of another order, which pervades 
human experience, even manifests itself in human 
actions and relations, yet is always purely itself ” 
(34). Plays as diverse as Cymbeline, Antony and 
Cleopatra, Measure for Measure, The Winter’s 
Tale, and The Tempest receive mention because 
“reconciliation is their subject” and that “[t]hey are 
about forgiveness that is unmerited, unexpected, 
unasked, unconditional. In other words, they are 
about grace” (39). That said, Robinson focuses 
most of her creative and interpretive energy on 
Hamlet (40-45) and Antony and Cleopatra (45-49).
Not content to deal simply with reconciliation, 
she also considers scenes of recognition that 
precede those of reconciliation, as Robinson 
writes, “[a]gain and again they tell us really to see 
the people we thought we knew, and really to feel 
the sanctity of the bonds we think we cherish. They 
open onto the inarticulable richness concealed 
in the garments of the ordinary—in the manner 
of Christianity, properly understood” (223). 
Ultimately, she argues, to read Shakespeare is to 
participate in metaphysics. Or in theology (224).
There is so much more I could say. I should 
have mentioned her essay on fear as a driving force 
in contemporary America, which is in many ways 
prophetic of Donald Trump’s dramatic political 
rise. I find fascinating the ease with which she 
transcends typical religious categories (e.g., liberal 
vs. conservative). In this review I have said nothing 
regarding her civic mindedness and engagement, 
her scriptural interpretation, or her thoughts on 
Bonhoeffer and Barth. I implore you to take up and 
read and reread The Givenness of Things to discover 
much more. But if you have not read Robinson 
before, this is not the place to start; begin instead 
with her fiction. Then move to her nonfiction, and 
even so, I prefer the tight coherence of Absence of 
Mind or the essays in The Death of Adam to this 
present volume, and especially the more subdued 
argumentation in her previous nonfiction to the 
more forceful tone of The Givenness of Things.
Endnotes
1. For that article, see: http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/2015/11/05/president-obama-
marilynne-robinson-conversation/
2. Marilynne Robinson, Absence of Mind: The
Dispelling of Inwardness from the Modern Myth
of the Self (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2010), 32-33, 43.
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3. See also, for example, her guest appearance
with astrophysicist Marcelo Gleiser on the
radio show On Being, “The Mystery We Are,”
January 2, 2014. The transcript can be found at
http://www.onbeing.org/program.
4. See, for example, her 2015 Presidential Lecture
in the Arts and Humanities at Stanford: http://
news.stanford.edu/news/2015/november/
robinson-humanities-lecture-110315.html
The Political World of Bob Dylan: Freedom and Justice, Power and Sin. Taylor, Jeff, and Chad Israelson, 
New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. 304pp. ISBN: 978-1137482341. Reviewed by Dave Schelhaas, 
Professor Emeritus of English, Dordt College. 
For anyone who is a lifelong Dylanophile—
and they are legion—this book is a treasure 
trove. It teems with historical material about the 
iconic artist’s life and career, with piquant Dylan 
quotations drawn from countless interviews, 
with analyses of lyrics (though, sadly, lyrics are 
not quoted in the book—probably because 
of copyright prohibitions) and analyses of his 
relationship with the Jesus people in the 1970s 
who were instrumental in his conversion. It 
establishes that from the time of his conversion 
Dylan has remained a believer in Jesus Christ. 
Most importantly, it integrates all of this data to 
defend a thesis concerning Dylan’s political and 
spiritual beliefs. The Political World of Bob Dylan 
explores Dylan’s relationship to many ideologies 
and movements, but at its core is the contention 
and the attempt to show that after his conversion 
Dylan became a Christian anarchist.
Chad Israelson, author of the first three 
chapters, writes about Dylan’s early years in 
Hibbing, Minnesota, living on the iron range 
where it was more of a stigma to be rich than poor. 
Here Dylan—then Robert Zimmerman—learned 
of the ravages caused by economic downturns. 
Here he developed from his Jewish tradition a 
sense of the sacred. Here he came to appreciate 
spirituality and recognize that Christianity and the 
Jewish faith were inextricably linked. But here he 
also learned that the demand for conformity was 
powerful in his small, tightly-knit community, and 
that he would have to leave it and “keep running” 
to fulfill his dreams.
In Chapter 2, “Voice of a Generation,” Israelson 
traces Dylan’s life from his early fame in the 1960s 
until the present. He shows how his music fits 
with some of the ideas of the New Left, the Peace 
Movement, and the Civil Rights Movement, and 
then he moves on to show Dylan’s continuing 
influence and experiences up to the present. 
Early in Chapter 3, Israelson writes that 
“over a span of a career from the early 1960s into 
the twenty-first century Dylan has called into 
question all power structures be they political, 
legal, economic or social” (94). He then goes on 
to illustrate this point by examining more than 
twenty of Dylan’s songs that deal with freedom 
and justice.  Analyses of “The Lonesome Death 
of Hattie Carroll” and “Only a Pawn in Their 
Game” (about the shooting of Medgar Evers) are 
especially effective in showing Dylan’s nuanced 
understanding of evil. Dylan does not blame the 
deaths of Carroll and Evers simply on the evil men 
who killed them but on “a system of institutional 
racism that pitted poor whites against Blacks” and 
the “absence of legal equality” (99). Here, perhaps, 
we see the beginnings of Dylan as anarchist.
 What, you may ask, is a Christian anarchist? 
The word anarchy usually means a “state of 
lawlessness or political disorder brought about 
by the absence of government” and is often 
associated with people who go around blowing up 
government buildings. This is not the meaning of 
“Christian anarchist.” 
According to Jeff Taylor, the primary author of 
the last four chapters, “when used in its political, 
non-pejorative sense, anarchy refers to the absence 
of political authority,” and “anarchists are persons 
who advocate the elimination of government” 
but without violence. People who embrace this 
philosophy for “Christian” reasons are Christian 
anarchists. Examples of Christian anarchists given 
by Taylor are Leo Tolstoy and Albert Schweitzer. 
Using H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and 
Culture with its five responses to culture, Taylor 
places Christian anarchism in the “Christ Against 
Culture” category. He notes that even before 
he became a Christian, Dylan, with his protest 
